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It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional
properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this
assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we
perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical
commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, inten-
sional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not
perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and
influential arguments to the contrary fail.
I. Introduction: Perceiving dispositional properties
Beliefs can represent their objects as having pretty much any
property. Perceptual states, in contrast, represent their object as
having a limited set of properties. Some plausible candidates
include having a certain shape, size, color and spatial location.
The list may be extended but it will not encompass all properties.
The property of having been made in 2008 in Malaysia is unlikely
to be perceptually represented. The question is then which prop-
erties are represented in perception and which ones are not.
The more specific question I would like to examine here is
whether we can perceive objects as having dispositional proper-
ties: whether the following claim is true:
(PD) There are some dispositional properties that we can per-
ceive objects as having.
(PD) has been widely rejected or at least treated with mistrust. I
will argue that at least under one interpretation of this claim, this
mistrust is not justified.
I make a distinction between two interpretations of the claim
that we perceive dispositional properties and argue that if we
1 The pun is not mine. It’s from McGinn 1996, p. 540.
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interpret the claim in the first, extensional, way, then whether we
perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical
commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, inten-
sional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not
perceive dispositional properties.
A brief note on the relevance of this issue. The question whether
we perceive dispositional properties has mainly been discussed in
connection with the dispositional theories of colour, as a poten-
tially fatal argument against these theories: if we cannot perceive
dispositional properties, then colour cannot be a dispositional
property (Boghossian and Velleman 1989, McGinn 1996, but cf.
Langsam 2000, Cohen 2009, 2010 and see Byrne 2001 for a
summary).
But this is not the only reason why we should be interested in
the question about whether we perceive dispositional properties.
A couple of quick examples: it has been argued that we perceive
objects as being causally efficacious (Siegel 2005, 2009), as edible,
climbable or Q-able in general (Nanay forthcoming a, forthcom-
ing b, forthcoming c), as agents (Scholl and Tremoulet 2000), as
having some kind of normative character or value (Kelly 2010,
Matthen 2010), as having moral value (Kriegel 2007) and as
affording certain actions (for very different versions of this claim,
see Gibson 1966, 1979, Bach 1978, esp. p. 368, Jeannerod 1988,
Jeannerod 1994, esp. Section 5, Jeannerod 1997, Jacob-Jeannerod
2003, esp. pp. 202–204, Humphreys and Riddoch 2001, Riddoch
et al. 1998, esp. p. 678).
As these properties are dispositional properties, these claims
seem to presuppose that we can perceive dispositional properties.
And if it is true that we do not perceive dispositional properties,
then these accounts are hopeless and shouldnot be taken seriously.
In short, whether we perceive dispositions has serious implications
for a number of important questions in philosophy of perception.
There has been a lot of discussion about whether we perceive
objects as having sortal properties: as tables, chairs, etc. If this is
treated as an open question, it seems fair to reexamine the argu-
ments that convinced themajority of the philosophical community
that we do not perceive dispositional properties.
II. Two interpretations of (PD)
There are at least two different ways of understanding the ques-
tion about whether we perceive dispositional properties, depend-
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ing on whether we take perception to be an extensional or an
intensional notion.2 Although these two questions are not always
sufficiently distinguished in the literature on perceiving disposi-
tions,3 they need to be kept apart. (It may be worth noting that
there is a third question in the vicinity that I will not talk about:
about whether it seems to us that we perceive dispositional prop-
erties (Langsam 2000). I agree with Byrne 2001’s doubts (esp.
p. 244) about whether we can (and whether we should) resolve
this third question.)
II. a. First interpretation: perception as an extensional concept
Perception can be taken to be extensional: in this case, the ques-
tion is whether our perceptual system responds to, or tracks,
dispositional properties. The perceptual system responds to some,
but not all, properties. Take a random property of the perceived
object and change it. If the perceptual system is influenced by this
change, then this property is perceived in the extensional sense.
And if the perceptual system is influenced by a change in a
dispositional property of the perceived object, then at least some
dispositional properties are perceived in the extensional sense. I
call this interpretation extensional because if P and Q are coex-
tensive properties, then if the perceptual system responds to prop-
erty P, this implies that it also responds to property Q.
The debated claim then is the following:
(PDE) There are some dispositional properties that our per-
ceptual states respond to.
If we accept a version of the causal theory of perception (Grice
1961, Strawson 1974, Lewis 1980), then (PDE) amounts to a claim
about (singular) causation. So answering the question about
2 Sellars 1978 makes a similar distinction in the context of discussing the representa-
tion of dispositional properties.
3 An important exception is Jonathan Cohen who is very explicit about focusing on
the extentional interpretation only (Cohen 2009, p. 161, Cohen 2010, Section 2). Colin
McGinn makes a similar, but importantly different, distinction between the highly inten-
sional and not highly intensional contexts and argues that ‘looks’ is an operator that
introduces the former (McGinn 1983, pp. 133–135 – note that he talks about ‘looks’ and
not about ‘perceives’). In McGinn 1996, p. 538, he points out that he had been mistaken
about the relevance of this distinction to the question about whether dispositions are
perceived.
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whether we perceive dispositional properties, in this extensional
sense of the term, will involve taking sides in the grand debate
about the properties of (singular) causation.
In short, (PDE) seems to imply that dispositional properties are
causally relevant in bringing about perceptual states. There are
many ways of denying this. First, we can deny that properties are
causally relevant at all, like Davidson once did (Davidson 1967,
Davidson 1970, Davidson 1993). Second, even if we allow for the
causal relevance of some properties, then whether dispositional
properties can be among the causally relevant ones will depend
on our stance on causal exclusion: if the categorical base of the
disposition is causally efficacious and attributing causal efficacy to
dispositional properties would amount to causal overdetermina-
tion (see Bennett 2003 and Mumford 1998 for a good summary).
It has recently been argued that if we take the causally efficacious
properties to be tropes, then dispositional properties and their
categorical bases could both be causally efficacious (Ehring 1997,
Ehring 1999, Robb 1997, Nanay 2009, but see Noordhof 1998’s
worries). Whether or not this proposal works, it is easy to see that
answering the question about whether dispositional properties are
causally relevant in bringing about perceptual states requires
taking a stance in some of the most important contemporary
metaphysical debates (causal exclusion, tropes vs. universals, the
causal efficacy of properties, etc). There is no easy way of arguing
for, or against, (PDE) without taking sides in these grand debates.
But note that the questions I started this paper with are not
about (PDE). They are not about whether our perceptual states
respond to dispositional properties, but rather about whether
they attribute dispositional properties to the perceived scene. And
this brings us to the second, intensional way of thinking about
perception.
II. b. Second interpretation: perception as an intensional concept
There is an intensional way of interpreting the question about
whether we perceive dispositional properties. The question
then is whether we perceive objects as having dispositional prop-
erties: whether we attribute dispositional properties to objects
perceptually.
I assume that we perceive particulars out there in the world.
Suppose I perceive an apple. This apple has a lot of properties.
Some of them I represent it as having, but most of them I do not
302 BENCE NANAY
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
represent it as having. Of those properties that I represent it as
having some, but not all, are perceptually represented. Hence, the
claim that we perceive dispositional properties (in the intensional
sense of the term) amounts to saying that some of those proper-
ties that we perceptually represent objects as having are disposi-
tional. In other words, dispositional properties can show up in
perceptual content (and not only in the content of our beliefs).
Thus, on the intensional interpretation, the claim that we per-
ceive dispositional properties amounts to the following:
(PDI) There are some dispositional properties that are percep-
tually represented.
I call this interpretation intensional because if P and Q are coex-
tensive properties, then perceptually representing property P
does not imply perceptually representing property Q.
Note the difference between (PDE) and (PDI). (PDI) does not
imply, and is not implied by, (PDE). A perceptual state can
respond to, that is, it can be caused by, the instantiation of a
property and yet fail to attribute this property. And conversely, a
perceptual state can represent an object as having a property that
this object fails to have.
A couple of important clarifications are in order. First, in (PDI)
and the preceding paragraph, I talked about perception in rep-
resentational terms. I was assuming (like Peacocke 1992, Siegel
2010, Pautz 2010, Nanay 2010) that perceptual states are repre-
sentations. But it is not the only way of thinking about
perception.
It has been argued that perceptual states do not represent
anything: they are not representations at all (Martin 2004, forth-
coming, Campbell 2002, Travis 2004, Brewer 2006, forthcoming).
They may be thought of as ‘presenting’ some properties, but they
do not represent these properties. If we accept this framework,
the question is what properties are presented or attributed in
perceptual experiences. The important point is that regardless of
whether we accept a ‘representational’ or a ‘relational’ view of
perception (to use the terminology of Campbell 2002), the ques-
tion about which properties are perceived (interpreted in the
intensionalist way) and which ones aren’t can (and should) be
raised (see Siegel 2006). In what follows, I will use the ‘represen-
tational’ terminology and assume that perceptual states represent
objects as having various properties, but the argument can be
rephrased to fit the relationalist framework.
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Second, I amnot assuming that perceptual representationneeds
to be conscious. Perception can be conscious or unconscious and
some properties are represented perceptually and consciously,
some others are represented perceptually and unconsciously. And
a third set of properties is represented non-perceptually. (PDI)
claims that at least some dispositional properties are perceptually
represented (maybe consciously, maybe unconsciously).
Third, the debates that make it important to clarify whether we
can perceive dispositional properties are, with one important
exception, all about (PDI) and not about (PDE). They are about
whether we perceptually represent causal relation, edibility or the
way objects are to be used and not about whether our perceptual
system responds to these properties. The important exception is
the debate about the ontology of color: here the question is about
whether color properties themselves are dispositional properties,
not about how we represent them.
I argue that we have no reason to reject (PDI). I will take the
two most important arguments that are taken to be conclusive
against (PDI) and point out that the first one is in fact an argu-
ment against (PDE) and the second one works only if we make
some very dubious, and widely rejected, assumptions about the
nature of perceptual content.
III. The Modal Argument
The received opinion is that (PDI) is false. As Colin McGinn says,
“solubility is a property you infer rather than one that [. . .] is
directly revealed to you” (McGinn 1996, p. 540). McGinn’s reason
for rejecting (PDI), which has become a standard reference is an
argument I will label ‘the Modal Argument’. McGinn summarizes
the Modal Argument in the following way:
Dispositions are inherently modal notions – and you do not
sensemodalities with your sensemodalities. You do not see what
would obtain in certain counterfactual situation; you see only
what actually obtains. [. . .] Your eyes do not respond to woulds
and might have beens. Dispositions depart too far from the actual
world to be objects of simple sight (McGinn 1996, p. 540).
Various versions of this argumenthave been so influential that even
those who maintain that we perceive some dispositional properties
accept the validity of this argument but point out that it fails to
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apply in the case of some special dispositional properties. Michael
Tye agrees with the deniers of (PD) that we do not perceive the
textbook examples of dispositional properties, like being brittle or
being elastic, but argues that we do perceive the hardness of a lump
of granite (which he takes to be a dispositional property, see Tye
2000, pp. 161–162). Jonathan Cohen explicitly accepts the Modal
Argument for dispositional properties like being soluble or being
fragile but argues that there are exceptions, and being red is one of
them (Cohen 2009, pp. 160–163, Cohen 2010, Section 2).
The Modal Argument is explicitly taken to apply against the
intensional interpretation, that is, against (PDI). As McGinn says,
“dispositions of whatever kind cannot themselves enter visual
content” (McGinn 1996, p. 540). And again, “dispositions lie
strictly outside of what is immediately perceptually presented”
(McGinn 1996, p. 540).
My claim is that this argument is in fact an argument against
(PDE) and not against (PDI). Whether our perceptual states are
sensitive to what goes on in nearby possible worlds is relevant if
we are interested in what properties our perceptual states respond
to. And the argument makes a neat case for the claim that as
perceptual states do not respond to (they are not causally related
to) modal facts, they do not respond to dispositional properties
either. If you change some facts in some nearby possible worlds, it
seems unlikely that our perceptual states would change as a result.
AsMcGinn put it, out “eyes do not respond towoulds andmight have
beens” (McGinn 1996, p. 540).
But this claim is about what our eyes respond to and not about
what enters into the content of our perceptual states. It may or
may not establish that (PDE) is false, but the real question is
whether this argument jeopardizes (PDI). And I argue that it does
not, for the following reasons.
A simple and relatively uncontroversial fact about perception is
the following. Perceiving x as F does not imply that I perceive what
makes this so, that is, what makes it the case that x is F. We can
perceive something as being cold, without perceiving it as having a
certain kinetic energy. I do not take this claim to be particularly
controversial.4
4 A number of philosophers used this observation for various purposes. Just two
examples: Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 94 used it to argue against the claim that perceptual
states cannot represent universals or resemblance classes (see Nanay forthcoming d);
Susanna Siegel uses it in her arguments about the perceptual representation of causation,
see Siegel 2005 and Siegel 2009.
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But then we can apply this claim to the perceptual representa-
tion of dispositional properties. Take elasticity: we can perceptu-
ally represent a rubber band as elastic without perceptually
representing what makes it so. What makes the rubber band
elastic is presumably that it can expand: in some nearby possible
worlds it expands. But we do not need to perceptually represent
what makes it elastic to perceptually represent it as elastic. Hence,
we do not need to perceptually represent these nearby possible
worlds in order to perceptually represent the rubber band as
being elastic.
More generally, if P is a dispositional property then what makes
it the case that x is P is a set of modal facts (about how x would
behave in some nearby possible worlds). But just as we do not have
to represent the kinetic energy of an ice cube perceptually in
order to perceive it as cold, we do not need to represent these
nearby possible worlds perceptually in order to perceive x as P.
In short, the Modal Argument that has led many to reject (PDI)
may or may not be a good reason to reject (PDE), but it fails to
apply in the case of (PDI). We have no prima facie reason to reject
(PDI).
IV. The argument from systematic perceptual
misrepresentation
Here is another, maybe less influential, but potentially equally
devastating argument against (PDI). Suppose that we have reason
to reject (PDE). Maybe because of the Modal Argument I exam-
ined above or maybe for some other reasons. I argued above that
(PDI) and (PDE) are different claims and, importantly, (PDE)
does not imply (PDI). The worry is that if we reject (PDE) and
accept some fairly weak additional premises, we have reason to
reject (PDI) as well.
More precisely, the worry is that we could not maintain (PDI)
while denying (PDE) without presupposing that perception sys-
tematically misrepresents the world. If we reject (PDE), then our
perceptual states do not respond to dispositional properties.
Nonetheless, because of (PDI), they represent them. How can
perceptual states represent properties they do not respond to
without systematic misrepresentation? In short, the worry is that
denying (PDE) and endorsing (PDI) would imply systematic per-
ceptual misrepresentation.
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This worry is misguided. Remember that (PDE) is about what
our perceptual states respond to, that is, about the causal relation
between our perceptual states and some properties. But (PDI) is
not about the representation of causal relations between some
properties and our perceptual states, but about the perceptual
representation of some properties themselves. And it is certainly
possible that a perceptual state would represent a property, and
do so correctly, without being caused by it. In fact, in some meta-
physical frameworks of singular causation, notably, Davidson’s,
this is necessarily so, as no properties whatsoever are involved in
causing a perceptual state (Davidson 1970, 1993, see also Nanay
2009). But even if we accept that some properties are causally
relevant when it comes to bringing about perceptual states, the
ones that are causally relevant may not be the ones that these
perceptual states represent. In short, (PDI) is about what proper-
ties are represented, whereas (PDE) is about what properties are
causally relevant – there is no prima facie clash between (PDI) and
the negation of (PDE).
To be fair, according to some accounts of perception, percep-
tual content is self-referential (Searle 1983, Searle 1991). Accord-
ing to these accounts, the content of perceptual experiences is to
be specified in the following manner: “I have a visual experience
(that there is a yellow station wagon there and the fact that there
is a yellow station wagon there is causing this visual experience)”
(Searle 1983, p. 48, Searle 1991, p. 228). If we accept this account
of perceptual content, then (PDI) and the negation of (PDE)
would in fact imply systematic perceptual misrepresentation.
But Searle’s account of the self-referentiality has been thor-
oughly criticized and almost universally rejected for a number
of different reasons (Burge 1991, McDowell 1991, Dokic 1998,
Bach 2007, Recanati 2007). And if (PDI) and the negation of
(PDE) implies systematic perceptual misrepresentation only if we
endorse this severely criticized account of perceptual content,
then the argument from systematic perceptual misrepresentation
does not jeopardize (PDI). In short, (PDI) can be true even if
(PDE) is false.
V. Conclusion
Most of the discussion about what properties are represented by
perceptual experiences concerns sortal properties (see, e.g.,
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Siegel 2006, Bayne 2009, Masrour forthcoming). When I am
looking at the object in front of me, do I perceive it as a table or
do I perceive it as having a certain shape, size and color and I only
infer that it is a table? In other words, besides the properties of
having certain shape, size and color, is the property of being a
table also represented in perception?
I proposed that we should raise similar questions about dispo-
sitional properties. Do I perceive objects as, say, dangerous or
fragile or edible? Or else, do I perceive it as having various shape-
and size-properties and I infer, on the basis of these properties
that it is soluble? I argued that we have no reason to exclude the
possibility that dispositional properties can be perceptually repre-
sented. Of course not all dispositional properties are perceptually
represented, just like, presumably, not all sortal properties are
perceptually represented either. But instead of assuming (without
any valid argument) that none are, we should examine which ones
are and which ones are not.
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